Approved For Release 2006/03/18 CIA RDP82-00457R010200450004-2

INFORMATION REPORT

CHUNTO China/Southeest Asia

DATE OF INFO.

DATE DISTR 19 Feb 52

SUBJECT Increased Power for Man Tse-tung and Chinese Communist Politburo

NO. OF PAGES

25X1C PLACE ACQUIRED

September - 11 October 1951

NO. OF ENCLS. LISTED BELOW

SUPPLEMENT TO

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REPORT NO.

1. At a secret meeting of the Political Consultative Conference in September or October 1951, it was decided to entrust to the Chinese Communist Politburo the promulgation of laws pertaining to the declaration of war, to negotiations for peace, and to mobilization. Although the Polithuro has had full control of Communist China sovereignty, this new measure enhances its prestige and raises MAO to the position in China which Stalin occupies in the USSR.

- The Chinese Politburo recently added two units which have no counterparts in the Soviet Politburo. One is the Secretariat Bureau which is composed of members of the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) as well as of the Politburo. This is an attempt to transform the RMC into the Secretariat Bureau and further consolidate the power of the Chinese Communist Party. On 15 October the Politburo placed one of its secretaries in each of the Communist Party's branch bureaus instead of a Politburo representative as it has done in the past. In this way, the bureau is authorized to exercise the power of the central Communist Party organization, and if the area under a bureau is cut off from the central government because of war, the bureau can act in the emergency independently.
- 3. The other new unit is the Advisory Group, which consists of members of the Soviet Politburo and representatives of countries in Southeast Asia including Communists and non-Communist members. Although this does not harmonize with the normal Communist Party set-up, it is based on MAO's plan for "cooperation of the leaders' class". Through this organization, MAO can interfere with the central government and party affairs of countries in Southeast Asia.
- On 11 October HSU Ping (奈成) was named secretary of the Chinese Politburo to be stationed in the South China Sub-Bureau; Major General Ma-ch'i-no-fu of Vietnam. Ma-li-no is in Canton and directs Chinese Communist operations against Taiwan.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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25X1A	1.	an approment was proposed to the Political Consultative Conference which pro
		vided that the chairman of the government, as commander-in-chief of the army, would be empowered to control peace negotiations and the mobilization and demphilization of the army. The Chinese Polithuro has issued a directive which provides that before a mobilization law is drafted by the
		Political Consultative Conference, a preparatory order may be substituted to push national defense activities. In an internal emergency the Revolutionary Military Council can authorize the commander-in-chief of the army to promulgate a mobilization order, presumably under the authority
		of the preparatory order. In an international emergency, the council would be required to secure the consent of the USSR before taking action.
25X1A	2.	Comment. Possibly the difference between a secretary and a representative of the Polithuro is that a secretary is empowered to act as the highest Communist Party authority in an emergency, while a representative is not.
5X1A	3.	of 1 July 1950 as deputy chief of the United Front Activities Department
25X1A 25X1A	40.	Comment. Probably Ma-li-no-fu, a Soviet adviser to the awangtung Military District. See

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